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OperatingMethods and Collec-
tion Experience
THE ways in which industrial banking companies obtain
and handle business are fundamentally similar to those fol-
lowed by other consumer credit agencies. Since many in-
dustrialbanking companiesareengagedinamore
diversified type of lending, and offer in addition certain
non-lending services to their customers, their problems dif-
fer somewhat from those of other agencies. But like other
comparable institutions they are required to conduct an
effective promotional campaign to insure maximum em-
ployment of their lending capacity; out of the total number
of loan applications filled out by prospective borrowers they
must select, a group to whom loans will be made; because
their selection must be speedy as well as careful, they must
develop procedures that will facilitate their choice of risks.
These various practices will be discussed in this chapter,
and in the concluding section their adequacy will be meas-
ured by a body of data covering collection experience on
accepted loans.
METHODS OF OBTAINING AND HANDLING
BUSINESS
Advertising Techniques
In industrial banking, as in other fields of consumer credit,
the so-called "repeat" borrower is an important source of
loan volume, but what proportion of the industrial lending
980
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business is to be ascribed to loans to old customers cannot
be ascertained exactly. The fact that most of the firms
circularize those who have proved to be reliable risks is in
itself indicative. Replies to a questionnaire distributed by
the American Industrial Bankers Association indicate that
somewhat more than half of the loan volume of the reporting
companies came from former borrowers.' These data, how-
ever, cover only a small proportion of the total volume of
industrial lending, and they make no distinction between
investment and non-investment types of agencies.
in their endeavor to attract new borrowers, and to win
over the clients of competitors, industrial banking coin-•
panics must engage in various forms of advertising. It is not
possible to say with any definiteness how much is spent for
this purpose. One figure frequently mentioned as a stand-
ard is ½ to 1 percent of total loan volume, with the quali-
fication that a new company is likely to spend more and
an old company less. According to information supplied by
the American Industrial Bankers Association, reporting
members in 1937 carried an average advertising budget of
from 1/3to1 percent of the total volume of their loans
during that year. In 1936 the members Of the association
reported that advertising expenses amounted, on the average,
to about 2½ percent of gross income. As far back as 1925
the advertising outlays of 25 reporting members of the
Morris Plan Bankers Association amounted to 4.8 percent
of gross expense and 3.6 percent of gross income.2 A year
later 19 New England Morris Plan companies reported that
their outlays for advertising amounted to 5.6 percent of
their gross expense and 4.4 percent of their gross income.3
Myron R. Bone, "Industrial Banks Loan Many Millions Yearly" in Ameri-
can Industrial Banker, vol. 4, no. 6 (December 1938) p. 7.
2WalterD. Brown, "Comparative Statistics for the Year 1925" in Morris
Plan Banker (January 1926) pp. 17-21.
Walter D. Brown, "Average Income and Expense Figures, 19 Morris Plan
Companies" in ibid. (May 1927) p. 113.100 INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES
These proportions have remained substantially constant, as
is indicated by the fact that in 1937 companies reporting
to the Morris Plan Bankers Association were allocating 5.9
percent of their total expenses to advertising.4
While many types of advertising are used, there seems to
be a general tendency for companies to concentrate on news-
papers and direct mailing as means of reaching potential
borrowers. Other media are billboards,posters, window
cards, radio, personal canvass, advertisements in street cars
or directories or on moving picture screens, and the multitude
of items distributed free of charge.
The advertising problem of industrial banking companies
differs somewhat from that of most other businesses in that
industrial lenders are concerned with attracting only accepta—
ble applicants, since the cost of making loans is augmented
when a company has to examine and reject poor risks.
From this point of view direct mail advertising has much
to commend it, for it reaches a select group, whereas radio
programs, billboard posters or other non-selective forms of
advertising may interest large numbers of applicants of whom
the majority may have to be rejected.
Except when they are engaged in launching a new service,
industrial banking firms tend to emphasize the most profita-
ble types of loans• in their advertising. In general, they
follow a schedule of advertising copy designed to fit the
different periods of the year, sometimes employing the
services of outside advertising agencies. Many companies
have succeeded to some extent in determining which of
their advertising techniques is most productive by asking
the new customer the reasons for his choice of company.
The replies may be somewhat unreliable, but they usually
indicate that references from old customers yield more new
business than any of the forms of commercial advertising
employed.
Derived from data supplied by the Morris Plan Bankers Association.OPERATION AND COLLECTION 101
Office Organization
Broadly speaking, the office organization of an industrial
banking company is set up along the lines of the firm's
principal activities—extending credit, receiving payments,
keeping records and collecting accounts. It varies, however,
with the size of the firm, the amount of business handled
and the assortment of services offered. Small companies are
similar in office organization to the independent personal
finance companies; the staff usually consists of a manager,
an assistant and a secretary. At the other extreme are the
very large firms that have a much larger and more special-
ized corps of workers. One large company, for example, has
a department for receiving applications, a women's depart-
ment, a special organization of committees to pass on loan
applications, departments for receiving hypothecated and
unhypothecated deppsits, a checking account division, a
sales finance section, and adjustment, legal, auditing and
accounting, insurance, purchasing, advertising, personnel and
real estate departments.
One way of measuring the efficiency of an office organiza-
tion is to determine how many lOans are made per year per
employee. Although such data are fragmentary at best, it
seems reasonably safe to say that for industrial banking
companies the average number of outstanding loan accounts
per employee is in the neighborhood of 300. A study made
in 1935, covering 16 Pennsylvania companies with average
outstandings of about $120,000, showed that the average
number of loans outstanding per full-time employee was
Somewhat more than half the member companies re-
porting to the American Industrial Bankers Association over
the period 1935-39 had in those five years an average of 200
to 500 loan accounts outstanding per employee.6 The figure
Harry R. Hickox, "Volume, Losses and Costs Studied in Pennsylvania" in
American Industrial Banker, vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1935) p. 6.
6Datasupplied by the American Industrial Bankers Association.102 INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES
of 300 loan accounts outstanding per employee is regarded
as a rough standard of efficiency.7
Credit Procedure
The procedures followed in the granting of loans, the in-
vestigation of credit and the collection of payments vary for
different types of loans and for companies of different sizes.
Large firms tend,the whole, to adopt a more highly
standardized and routinized procedure than do small firms.
In a relatively small office the procedure is fairly simple.
The applicant isfirst interviewed by the manager or his
assistant. Then he fills out the usual loan application blank
and arranges to present collateral security, or to obtain the
signature of comakers, or to have his car or household
chattels inspected. The applicant's credit record is then
checked. If he is a regular customer the checking is quickly
accomplished. If he is not, various sources of credit informa-
tion must be consulted, the type of credit investigation de-
pending in large part on the facilities available.
First, the office may have its own credit file containing
published notes on suits, judgments, foreclosures and the
like. Second, there is almost always some kind of mercantile
credit agency in the community, from which reports on
prospective borrowers may be purchased. These reports in
some instances relate exclusively to open-book accounts; in
Data on "loan accounts per employee" must be examined withgreatcare.
Sometimes they refer to average loan accounts outstanding, sometimes to
loans made during the year, and in either case there is usually some doubt
as to the number of employees to be included in the calculation; the latter
difficulty arises particularly from the fact that there are often part-time as
well as full-time workers. Furthermore, it is necessary to take account of the
fact that an industrial banking company has savings as well as loan accounts,
which must be handled by the same working force, and that there may be
variation among companies in regard to the frequency of instalment pay-
ments made on loans; some companies make loans that are repayable on a
weekly basis, thus increasing the number of transactions to be handled by
the working force. Considerations such as these doubtless explain the wide
variations in reports on "number of loan accounts per employee."OPERATION AND COLLECTION 103
others they cover retail instalment credit as well. For loans
of $1000 or more the company may buy a more exhaustive
credit report, as well as a legal report on suits and judg-
ments in which the applicant may have been involved.
Finally, there may be a central lenders' credit bureau from
which information may be obtained as to the applicant's
present status and past record with cash lending and sales
financing firms. In some instances the credit bureau serves
only as a clearing agency, in which case the lender has to
make a special inquiry of the firms to which he is referred.
The credit bureaus differ in scope and reliability from one
locality to another. In some cities all lenders, regardless
of type, cooperate in exchanging information; in others
intense competition may lead to a complete breakdown of
the system.
In addition to seeking information from whatever organ-
ized credit bureaus or exchanges are available, the company
makes its own check of the applicant's employment, income,
residence and family indebtedness. In most cases this amounts
only to verification, by telephone, of inforination given by
the applicant. Some lenders in the smaller cities hold regu-
larly scheduled weekly meetings at which the delinquent
accounts of all lenders are reviewed and discussed.Itis
rarely the case that a company will utilize all of these sources
of credit information, for some are considered more useful
than others and each tends to increase the cost of credit
investigation.
If the loan is made on the security of a chattel mortgage
on household furniture an appraiser is sent to visit the home
and to make a general inspection of the household. Since
foreclosures on household chattels are relatively rare,8 the
chief purpose of the home inspection is to impress the bor-
8SeeNational Bureau of Economic Research (Financial Research Program),
Personal Finance Companies and Their Credit Practices, by Ralph A. Young
and Associates (1940) Table 18, p. 77.104 INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES
rower with the desirability of prompt payment and to judge
from the atmosphere and upkeep of the household whether
the risk is likely to be a good one. If the loan is macic on
automobile collateral, the cariscarefully inspected and
valued.
When all of the relevant information has been assem-
bled and written on or attached to the loan application, a
decision is made on the extension of the credit. In a small
office the entire loan procedure may be handled by one
person, whereas in the larger firms it involves a highly sys-
tematized division of labor, with the loan officers passing
only on credits, and the interviews and investigation con-
ducted by others. In some cases there is a hierarchy of loan
officers; thus in one large company the less experienced
men are permitted to extend loans up to $360, the next
group up to $540, the next to $1200, and loans for more
than $1200 are usually passed by the principal officer of the
firm. Another common practice is the pooling of the re-
sponsibilities of two officers, who may together examine an
application and grant a loan equal to the sum of their sep-
arate credit authorities.
An important element in the credit granting organization
is the group referred to as the. "discount committee" or the
"loan committee." Where there are several loan officers,
applications are routed through the desks of all the officers,
the committee thus operating continuously. For very large
loans the committee may be composed o.f a selection of loan
officers, the president of the company and several directors,
the group meeting only at regular intervals.
It is difficult to assemble adequate statistical data on the
proportion of credit applications accepted by industrial
banking firms. One company operating a series of offices
reports that about one-third of the requests for loans are
rejected without the applicant's reaching the point of mak-
ing out a formal blank; of those actually made out, betweenOPERATION AND COLLECTION 105
one-quarter and one-half are finally accepted. An officer of
one of the largest industrial banking companies has stated
that during 1938 his firm extended 40,000 loans out of
60,000 or more applications.9 Another firm states that it
rejected 10 percent of the applications received during the
year l939.'° A survey made in 1938 by the American In-
dustrial Bankers Association, covering the practice of mem-
ber companies, revealed that approximately 75percentof
all loan applications received by all the reporting firms were
finally accepted; but some companies reported acceptances
amounting to 80 or 90 percent, others a much smaller pro-
portion, and one firm stated that it granted only 35 percent
of the number of loans requested."
The initial steps in the sales financing operations of an
industrial banking company differ substantially from those
described above.'2 Because the company wishes to avoid
repossession problems it will make the same careful credit
examination in such cases as it does for cash loan applica-
tions, but its relations with the dealer who is the original
source of the financing paper introduces new problems, and
the documents required to protect the lender's interest in
the collateral are quite different. It is essential in this type
of business to secure protection against such hazards as
duplicate or triplicate financing, excessive dealer payments,
illegal sale of merchandise or overvaluation of collateral
in transactions involving used commodities. While these
hazards are well known to experienced operators, the fact
Stephen B. Clark, "People and Profits in Personal Loans" in American
Industrial Banker, vol. 5, no. 1 (February 1939) p. 14.
MorrisPlan Bank of Virginia, Annual Report to the Stockholders, for the
year 1939, p. 3.
11MyronR. Bone, "Industrial Banks Loan Many Millions Yearly" in Ameri-
can Industrial Banker, vol. 4, no. 6 (December 1938) p. 8.
12Inthis type of financing the procedures followed by industrial banking
companies are necessarily similar to those current among sales finance com-
panies. For a discussion of the latter see National Bureau of Economic Re-
search (Financial Research Program), Sales Finance Companies and Their
Credit Practices, by W. C. Plummer and R. A. Young (1940) pp. 104-21.
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that financing agencies frequently run afoul of them is proof
of the necessity for constant caution. When companies
undertake to finance the time sale of merchandise directly
with the customer, rather than through the dealer, the pro-
cedure is more• nearly similar to that described above for
the making of cash loans, though special adjustments have
to be made to take account of the nature of the merchandise
security.
Whatever the methods may be that are employed in judg-
ing a risk, the lending company cannot disregard the need
for speed and for the maintenance of confidential relations
with the borrower. Both of these factors introduce impor-
tant elements of hazard into the business of granting credit,
but the exigencies of competition require that they be
recognized.
Collection Procedure
When a loan is made, a number of office records are pre-
pared. Whether payments are to be direct or hypothecated
in a special account, the dates when they are due are sched-
uled on the ledger card. In many offices loans are numbered
according to due dates sO that delinquency can be easily
detected. The first two digits of the number 302614, for
example, indicate that payments are due on the 30th of the
month, while the remainder staiid for the serial number
of the loan. Other symbols may be added to the number to
indicate the type of loan and other significant characteris-
tics.
For collecting delinquent payments most companies em-
pioy a basically uniform method. First they send out form
notices at appropriate intervals. Then, at a fairly early stage,
they telephone the delinquent borrower, or perhaps send
him a special letter signed by the manager, requesting pay-
ment or a consultation on the matter of a possible refinanc-
ing or extension of the loan. In some cases the adjustment• OPERATION AND COLLECTION 107
involves only a shifting of the due date or a change in the
frequency of instalments.
Not all firms employ outside collecting agents. Nor do
they all follow the same procedure with regard to comakers
involved in delinquency. Some companies communicate
with the comáker only when payment is long overdue,
while others issue an early warning in order to protect them-
selves against complaints from this source. As in the trans-
actions of other consumer credit agencies, the
note generally contains an acceleration clause giving the
lender the right, in case of default, to demand full payment
before the contractual maturity date. When this privilege is
exercised, legal action is usually necessitated.
COLLECTION EXPERIENCE
The collection experience of industrial banking companies is
measured by data on delinquencies and losses. Charge-offs on
loans are the primary source of loss but losses arise also from
dealings in other types of assets. Delinquencies are expressed
by a figure representing, for a particular date, the volume of
loans delinquent for a specified length of time in percent
of total loans outstanding on that date. The definition of
what constitutes delinquency has never been standardized,
though certain efforts have been made in this direction. Both
The Morris Plan Corporation of America and the Morris
Plan Bankers Association have urged Morris Plan companies
to use a definition according to which "a loan is delinquent
when no payment has been made for 4 weeks or more after
due date." Some companies provide more detailed informa-
tion by classifying delinquent accounts according to whether
the period since due date was 30 to 60 days, 60 to 90 days,
or 90 days or more. Since industrial banking companies in-
variably discount their loans, they are not confronted, as
are personal finance companies, with the problem of dis-io8 INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES
tinguishing delinquency on principal from delinquency on
charges.
The success of an industrial banking company in making
collections on its loans depends to a considerable extent
upon the management's ability to keep its delinquency
record favorable. To the extent that this task calls for very
skilful operation, the chances that competitive pressure will
so increase as to reduce rates and profits are greatly dimin-
ished. It is of course impossible to measure statistically the
differences in management ability in different firms, but
some indication of such differences is contained in compara-
tive figures on various companies' proportions of outstand-
ings which, at a particular date, have been delinquent for
a specified period of time. Such figures are presented in
Table 19, for 29 members of the American Industrial Bank-
TABLE 19
DISTRIBUTION OF 29 INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES,
DECEMBER 31, 1939, BY DELINQUENCY PERCENTAGE




































a Basedon data supplied by the American Industrial Bankers Association.
bYear-endoutstandings on loans delinquent for specified period, in percent
of total year-end loan outstandings. Delinquency is measured by the number
of days from date payment was due. Each levelis inclusive of the lower
figure and exclusive of the higher.OPERATION AND COLLECTION 109
ers Association; these 29 companies include "non-investment"
as well as "investment" firms, but for the present purpose
the distinction between the two types is not significant. Al-
though the wide disparity in delinquency experience re-
vealed by this table may be partly due to reporting methods,
it is unlikely that this factor explains the full range of the
distribution. In spite of the diversity of experience here
recorded, however, it is noteworthy that nearly half of the
companies reported less than 1.6 percent of their total loans
outstanding at the end of 1939 as having been delinquent
for 60 to 90 days, and that the same number of companies
reported this low percentage for loans delinquent 90 days
or longer.
Table 20 supplies, data on delinquency, and also on net
charge-offs on loans, for 10 Morris Plan institutions during
the period 1929-38. It is noteworthy that while delinquency
percentages (pertaining to loans on which no payment was
made for 4 weeks or more) were relatively high during the
depression years, they had declined by 1935, and thereafter,
to well under 2 percent. Net loan charge-offs (annual volume
of loan charge-offs, minus recoveries), expressed in percent
of the total annual loan volume, stood consistently at less
than 1 percent. Supplementary data show that in the years
1933-35 loan volume increased about $13,500,000, but de-
spite this increase net charge-offs declined from their peak
of 0.97 to the very small figure of 0.08 percent, rising there-
after to slightly less than 0.3 percent in 1938. There is no
consistent relation between year-to-year changes in net loan
charge-offs and in delinquency, nor is there perceptible any
close coordination between the net loan charge-off percent-
age for any one year and the delinquency percentage for
the preceding year. It is true, however, that the year of
highest delinquency, 1932, was followed by the year of
greatest charge-offs.
These data are, on the whole, corroborated by the figures110 INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES
TABLE 20
DELINQ,UENCY AND NET CHARGE-OFF PERCENTAGES ON











1932 . 4.38 .61






A Basedon data supplied by The Morris Plan Corporation of America.
'Year-endoutstandings on delinquent loans in percent of total year-end
loan outstandings. A delinquent account is defined as one on which no
payment has been made for 4 weeks or more after due date. Total out-
standings for each year were estimated by computing, for 20 companies in
which these 10 are included, the ratio of year-end outstandings to the volume
oF loans made during the year, and using this figure as a multiplier for the
volume of loans made during each year by the 10 companies.
Delinquency percentages, expressed as above, are available also, for the
years 1922-25 and 1929-32, on all Morris Plan banking companies. These
figures, however, while of wider coverage, have not the advantage of per-
taining to a single, unchanging group of firms:
1922 1.89 1929 2.46
1923 1.58 1930 2.93
1924 1.53 1931 3.43
1925 1.49 1932 4.89
oVolumeof loan charge-offs made during the year, minus recoveries, in per.
cent of the year's volume of loans made.
in Table 21, which shows, for 1930-36, the distribution of
26 members of the American Industrial Bankers Associa-
tion, by net charge-off percentage on loans. In all years the
majority of the companies had net charge-offs.amounting to
less than 1.6 percent of loan volume; on the other hand,
a considerable number of companies had a higher proportion,OPERATION AND COLLECTION 111
TABLE 21
DISTRIBUTION OF 26 INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES,
1930—36, BY NET CHARGE-OFF PERCENTAGE ON
Net Charge-off








































































TOTAL 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Based on data supplied by the. American Industrial Bankers Association.
bVolumeof loan charge-offs made during the year, minus recoveries, in
percent of the year's volume of loans made. Each level is inclusive of the
lower figure and exclusive of the higher.
A net charge.off percentage of less than zero indicates that the year's re-
coveries exceeded the year's volume of charge-offs.
some of them reaching as high as 5.6percentor more. Further
data from thisgroupof companies indicate that on themajor-
ity of loans charged off theoutstandingbalance was between
$50and $125.
Data on gross as well as net charge-offs on loans, classified
accOrding to size of company, are to be foundin Table22,
which has been prepared from reports made to the Federal
DepositInsuranceCorporatIon by insured industrial bank-
ingcompanies. In this table, however, loan charge-offs are
computed on the basis of total year-end outstandings in loans
and discounts (net of repayments on instalment loans). As
a result the percentages are higher than they would be if
they were computed, as in Tables 20 and 21, on the basis of
annual volume. It will be noted that, even with allowance112 INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES
TABLE 22
GROSS AND NET CHARGE-OFF PERCENTAGES ON LOANS
MADE BY INSURED INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES,
1934—38,BYSIZE OF COMPANy'S
Size of Company' 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Under $100,000
Number 18 18 17 20 21
Gross charge-off percentage 2.28 1 .83 .86 .44 .59
Net charge-off percentage 1 .72 1 .26 . 55 .27 .42
$100,000—ZOO ,000
Number 22 22 20 20 19
Gross charge-off percentage 2.671.551.22 .79 1.18
Net charge-off percentage 2.301.23 .64 .41 .62
$200 ,000—300,000
Number 8 10 13 16 17
Gross charge-offpercentage 2.57 1 .63 1 .02 1 .10 1.42
Net charge-off percentage 1 .72 .68 .44 .44 1.06
$300 ,000—500,000
Number 5 5 5 5 7
Gross charge-off percentage 1.09 .84 .81 .86 .79
Net charge-off percentage .57 .24 .02 .28 .43
$500,000—i ,000,000
Number 4 3 4 3 2
Gross charge-off percentage 1 .75 .95 .95 .88 .64
Net charge-off percentage .78 .30 .42 .29 .46
$1 ,000,000 & over
Number 3 4 4
Gross charge-off percentage 2.67i .57 1 .18 .78 .70
Net charge-off percentage 1.31 .50 —.26 .09 .18
ALL COMPANIES
Number 60 62 63 69 71
Gross charge-off percentage 2. 31 1 .42 1 .09 .82 .86
Net charge-off percentage 1 .33 .60 .09 .21 .40
Based on data supplied by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Figure on gross charge-oils represents volume of loan charge-offs made during
the year, in percent of total year-end outstandings in loans and discounts
(net of repayments on instalment loans). Figure on net charge-oils represents
gross charge-offs minus recoveries, in percent of same total.
bAsmeasured by total equity account (capital, surplus and undivided profits).
Each level is inclusive of the lower figure and exclusive of the higher.OPERATION AND COLLECTION 113
for this upward bias, the net charge-off percentages of the
entire group of insured companies were in 1934 and 1935
considerably higher than might be expected from the data
given in Table 20, and that in 1936 and 1937, in spite of
their upward bias, they were actually lower than the cor-
responding figures in Table 20. This suggests that in 1934
and 1935, the first years after their admission to insurance,
these companies followed a strict policy in writing off ques-
tionable loans, and subsequently made a high proportion of
recoveries on .the borderline paper.
This table indicates that in general the companies in the
$iOO,000-300,000 groups (size measured by equity funds)
had higher-than-average proportions of both gross and net
loan charge-offs in all five years of the period 1934-38, and
that companies in the $300,000-1,000,000 groups had lower-
than-average proportions. The experience of the very small
companies—those under $100,000—was, on the whole, bet-
ter than average on gross charge-offs but worse than average
on net charge-offs. In 1934-36 the largest companies—those
of $1,000,000 or over—recorded gross charge-offs in higher
proportion than all companies combined, but in all five
years their net charge-off percentages were lower than aver-
age; in fact, in: 1936 they had a negative percentage, indicat-
ing that in that year the volume of loan charge-offs was
exceeded by the volume of recoveries.
Reserves against charge-off losses on loans vary considera-
bly from one company to another. Information pertaining
to the practice of 20 members of the American Industrial
Bankers Association in 1937, and to that of 22 companies in
1938, shows that for the majority of these companies loss
reserves were for amounts up to 1.5 percent of outstanding
loans. Such a reserve is roughly in line with the average
loss experience on loans.
Loss data on assets other than loans are presented in Table
23 for the same group of insured companies and the same114 INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES
TABLE 23
GROSS AND NET Loss PERCENTAGES ON ASSETS OTHER
THAR LOANS HELD BY INSURED INDUSTRIAL BANKING
COMIANIES, 1934—38,BYSIZE OF COMPANYa
Size of 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Under $100,000
Number 18 18 17 20 21
Gross loss percentage 4.18 2.21 5.88 7.16 4.31
Net loss percentage 3.51 .51 .27 3.31 2.72
$100 ,000—200 ,000
Number 22 22 20 20 19
Gross loss percentage 2.043.154.16 6.0111.06
Net loss percentage 1 .04 .08 .093.269.70
$200 ,000—300000
Number 8 10 13 16 17
Gross loss percentage .75 1 .595.86 3. 95 5. 39
Net loss percentage —2.26—.483.822.59—1.37
$300 000—500 ,000
Number 5 5 5 5 7
Grosslosspercentage 12.547.4211.374.721.70
Net loss percentage 3.731.959.95 1.18 .50
$500,000—iP000,000
Number 4 3 4 .3 2
Grossloss percentage 5.93 1.60 7.8410.47 8.49
Netloss percentage —.60—3.83—1.4110.01 .94
$1,000,000 & over
Number 3 4 4 5 5
Grossloss percentage 4.057.037.99 8.215.44
Net loss percentage 2.334.785.726.321.76
ALL COMPANIES
Number 60 62 63 69 71
Gross loss percentage 4.00 5.25 7.117.375.64
Net loss percentage 1.932.523.865.482.36
Based on data supplied by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Figure on gross loss represents the year's volume of charge-offs on assets
other than loans, losses on assets sold or exchanged (mainly investment Se-
curities) and additions to valuation allowances, in percent of total securities
owned at the end of the year. Figure on net loss represents gross losses
minus recoveries on of assets other than loans, profits on assets
sold or exchanged and reductions in valuation allowances, in percent of
same total.
bAsmeasured by total equity account (capital, surplus and undivided profits).
Each level is inclusive of the lower figure and exclusive of the higher.OPERATION AND COLLECTION 115
period. These figures show a record of collection experience
quite different from that indicated in Table 22. With only
two or three exceptions the smaller companies—all those
having less than $300,000 in equity funds—had in all five
years lower than average loss percentages on assets other than
loans, both gross and net. The $300,000-1,000,000 companies
show a very inconsistent record, and those of $1,000,000
and over were above average in all years except 1938. The
type of loss covered in this table has greater significance
for the group of insured companies than for most industrial
banking companies, because the former have a larger pro-
portion of their total assets invested in securities.
Table 24 provides, in regard to loans and all other assets,
a comparison of the loss experience of three groups of in-
stitutions: insured industrial banking companies; insured
commercial banks, not members of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, that have deposits of $2,000,000 or less; and all insured
non-member commercial banks. The comparison of the first
two groups is particularly important because the banking
institutions they comprise are of about the same size and
operate under similar legal conditions. The table reveals
that of these two groups the industrial banking companies
had—in every year except 1938, when there was very little
difference—the lower net losses on loans (losses per $100
of total assets). In regard to net losses on assets other than
loans the comparative experience of these two types of in-
stitutions was not so consistent. As for the group of smaller
commercial banks in comparison with the entire group of
insured non-member commercial banks, their total losses,
both gross and net, were roughly similar in all years except
1935, when the smaller banks had substantially higher
losses, per $100 of total assets, than were experienced by
the entire group.
The importance of losses in relation to total expenses is



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)OPERATION AND COLLECTION 117
panies of different sizes. On the whole, in each year of the
period 1934-38, the ratio of losses to total expenses declined
from the smallest companies to a low for those in the $300,000-
500,000 size group (size measured by equity funds); the largest
companies had the highest ratio in all years except 1938. In
1936-38 the ratios of the smallest companies were about as
low as those of the $300,000-500,000 group, and in 1938 that
of the companies with equity funds of $1,000,000 or over was
approximately average. Except for these latter companies,
losses on loans were far higher, during 1934-35, than those on
other assets; after 1935 the differences between these two
sources of expense were less conspicuous, in several instances
the losses on loans even amounting to less than those on assets
other than loans. In general, this table indicates very clearly
that while losses may represent a relatively small proportion
of the total volume of business handled, they are far from
negligible as an element of expense, and that they might,
if not kept at low levels, seriously impair a company's
profitability.
For industrial banking companies based on data supplied by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. For commercial banks based on Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report, for the respective years,as
1934, pp. 198 and 238; 1935, pp. 176 and 200; 1936, p. 168; 1937, p.
146; 1938, p. 218. For 1934 and 1935 data on banks with deposits of $2,000,000
or less had to be estimated, because in these years the number of banks in
the various size groups that reported on losses differed from the number
that reported on total assets. Estimates were derived by calculating, for each
size group up to $2,000,000, the average loss for banks reporting on losses,
and multiplying by the number of banks in that size group that reported
on assets;the sums of the' totals thus obtained were then related to the
total assets of all banks having deposits of $2,000,000. or less. Data on com-
mercial banks pertain only to those banks that were in operation during
the entire year.
bGrosscharge-offs, losses on assets sold or exchanged and additions to valu-
ation allowances.
Gross losses minus recoveries on charge-offs, profits on assets sold or ex-
changed and reductions in valuation allowances.
Mainly investment securities.
Represents number of banks reporting on losses; 7,300 banks reported on
assets.
1Representsnumber of banks reporting on losses; 7,275 banks reported on
assets.ii8 INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES
TABLE 25
TOTAL GROSS LOSSES OFINSURED INDUSTRIAL BANK-
TOTAL EXPENSES, 1934—
38, BY SIZE OF COMPANYa




gross losses plus total current
companies' total expenses are
bAsmeasured by total equity
Lach level is inclusive of the
operating expenses. The dollar volumes of these
given in Table 44, pp. 156.57.
account (capital, surplus and undivided profits).
lower figure and exclusive of the higher.





























16.9 16.0 8.2 4.5 6.0
6.1 3.2 6.5 6.6 4.6
23.0 19.2 14.7 11.1 10.6
18.8 12.8 11.6 8.1 9.8
3.7 6.1 8.1 9.9 16.0
22.5 18.9 19.7 18.0 25.8
20.0 14.8 9.0 10.2 12.9
.6 1.6 8.4 6.1 4.2
20'.6 16.4 17.4 16.3 17.1
8.2 7.0 8.6 8.8 7.3
5.6 . 2.8 4.1 1.9 3.7
13.8 9.8 12.7 10.7 11.0
13.2 9.5 9.1 7.4 6.5
4.6 1.3 5.3 8.8 2.3
17.8 10.8 14.4 16.2 8.8
15.6 13.5 11.1 •7.7 6.9
12.4 11.4 13.8 12.4 8.5
28.0 24.9 24.9 20.1 15.4
15.4 12.5 10.3 8.0 8.2
8.3 7.3 10.1 10.1 8.0
23.7 19.8 20.4 18.1 16.2







on assets sold or ex-
expenses comprise total